The security vulnerabilities of a number of provable secure proxy signature schemes are examined with the assumption that users can register their public keys without having corresponding private keys. This assumption is different from that of a standard proxy signature in which the public keys of users are authentic. Under this assumption, both the Triple Schnorr scheme and Kang et al's scheme are shown to be vulnerable to a rogue public key registration attack. This attack gives an adversary the ability to generate a proxy signature without the valid agreement of the original signer. Moreover, it is shown that an adversary can manipulate the description of a delegated signing right at will. This work can be considered as an awakening to the importance of Proof of Possession (PoP) in the PKI environment, as in many cases certificate authorities do not require the PoP protocol, as has been stated [1] .
Introduction
A digital signature enables individual users to digitally sign a message. The validity of the digital signature can be checked by anyone with the signer's public key, while it is difficult to generate a user's digital signature without their private key.
A proxy signature is a digital signature that can be used to delegate the signing right of an entity, or original signer, to another entity, known as a proxy signer. In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer delegates his/her signing right by sending the verifiable proxy which includes the description of the delegated signing right to a proxy signer. Following this, the proxy signer generates a proxy signing key with the received proxy. After the generation of the proxy signing key, a message can be signed on behalf of the original signer with the proxy signing key. The proxy signature scheme should meet the following security requirements [12] :
• Verifiability: a verifier can be convinced of the original signer's agreement by verifying the proxy signature.
• Unforgeability: only the designated proxy signer can generate a valid proxy signature.
• Non-repudiation: a proxy signer cannot repudiate a valid proxy signature that has been generated.
A proxy signature can be used for many applications where a delegation facility is required, e.g. computational grids, mobile agents, and others [9] , [11] , [17] .
Since the first cryptographical treatment by Mambo et al [12] , many proxy signature schemes have been proposed and analyzed [8] , [10] , [11] , [15] , [18] , [19] . Additionally, a number of recent provably secure proxy signature schemes have been proposed. In 2003, Boldyreva et al. proposed the Triple Schnorr scheme which was the first provably secure proxy signature scheme [5] . In 2004, Kang et al. and independently Wang et al. proposed a provably secure proxy signature scheme based on a bilinear map [7] , [17] . To the best of the author's knowledge, these two schemes are the only ones which have not been shown to have any security vulnerability.
In this letter, a security vulnerability of the Triple Schnorr scheme as well as the scheme of Kang et al. is demonstrated on the assumption of a slightly but notably different version of the standard proxy signature. With this assumption, adversaries can register and renew their public keys freely without executing the PoP protocol, which is used to verify the user's possession of the private key that corresponds to the registered public key so as to make the registered public key authentic. With the standard proxy signature, it is assumed that the public keys of users are authentic. Thus, with the proposed assumption, adversaries have more power than with the assumption of the standard proxy signature as the adversaries can register their unauthentic public keys. However, this assumption is possible in the real-world setting as the current PKI standard does not specify the PoP protocol as a mandatory requirement: as the standard public key encryption and signature algorithms such as RSA or DSA have rare security vulnerability owing to the lack of the PoP protocol, this protocol is still not included in the standards thus far [1] , [2] , [14] . Moreover, as there still exist many certificate authorities that do not execute the PoP protocol, many standards recommend that public-key-based Copyright c 2006 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers security protocols should not assume the PoP protocol is executed during the registration of public keys [1] , [2] , [14] .
Under this assumption, a new attack is proposed with respect to both the Triple Schnorr scheme and the scheme of Kang et al. This attack is motivated by an exceptional case of the bilinear aggregate signature scheme [3] . In the bilinear aggregate signature scheme, the aggregation of two distinct entity signatures for the same message is not allowed as this can lead to a rogue public key registration attack [3] : if an adversary A generates a random private/public key pair and declares his/her public key to be a multiplication of the random public key and the multiplicative inverse of the target user T's public key, A can generate an aggregate signature of any message using the random private key as if both T and A sign the same message respectively.
In Kang et al's scheme [7] , the proxy signing key is a form of the aggregate signature such that both the original signer and the proxy signer sign the same message, in which the transferred signing right is described. Thus, the proxy signing key in this scheme is vulnerable to the rogue public key registration attack.
Using the above vulnerability, it is shown that A can generate a proxy signing key without the original signer's valid proxy if A can register his/her rogue public key. This attack gives A the ability to exercise any signing right on behalf of the target original signer. Moreover, it is shown that the rogue public key registration attack can be applied to the Triple Schnorr scheme [5] .
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. In Sects. 2 and 3, the Triple Schnorr scheme and Kang et al's scheme, respectively, are described. In Sect. 4, the rogue public key registration attack is presented. Finally, the conclusion is given in Sect. 5.
Triple Schnorr Scheme
The Triple Schnorr scheme [5] is a provably secure version of the KPW scheme [8] . Several researchers have posited that the security of the KPW scheme and the Triple Schnorr scheme are affirmative [5] , [10] , [17] . The description of the Triple Schnorr scheme is as follows. It is assumed that a ∈ R B indicates that a is a randomly selected element from the elements in B.
• Environment: let q and p = 2q + 1 be prime numbers, g ∈ Z p be a generator of order q, h : {0, 1} * → Z * q be a secure hash function, and m w ∈ {0, 1} * be the description of the delegated signing right. It is assumed that the original signer Alice and the proxy signer Bob have private/public key pairs
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Kang et al's Scheme
Kang et al's scheme [7] is based on the BLS short signature scheme for delegation and the Cha-Cheon ID-based signature scheme for proxy signature generation [4] , [6] . The description of Kang et al's scheme is as follows:
• Environment: assume that each user shares a multiplicative bilinear group G [4] , a prime number q, a generator g of order q, and two full-domain secure hash functions H 1 (·), H 2 (·, ·) where H 1 : {0, 1} * → G and H 2 : {0, 1} * × G → Z * q . It is also assumed that the original signer Alice and the proxy signer Bob have private/public key pairs
• Delegation: Alice generates a description of the delegated signing right m w ∈ {0, 1} * and computes s ← H 1 (m w ||y A ||y B )
x A and sends (m w , y A , s) to Bob. Bob verifies that (g, y A , H 1 (m w ||y A ||y B ), s) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple [6] , [7] .
• Proxy signature generation: with (m w , y A , s) , y A , y B , (u, v) ).
• Proxy signature verification: to verify the proxy sig- nature (m w , y A , y B , (u, v) ), the verifier generates the proxy public key pkp ← (y A · y B ) and computes h ← H 2 (m w ||y A ||y B ||m, u) . Finally, the verifier checks whether (g, pkp, u · H 1 (m w ||y A ||y B ) h , v) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple [6] , [7] . If it is a valid, the proxy signature is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid.
Rogue Public Key Registration Attack
In this section, a rogue public key registration attack is proposed on the assumption that users do not perform the PoP protocol when they register their public keys. As mentioned in Sect. 1, the present assumption is stronger than that of the standard proxy signature where the public keys of users are authentic. Under this assumption, the adversary can register their public key to the certificate authority without verifying his/her possession of the corresponding private key.
This assumption is practically feasible for the following reasons: In many standards [2] , [14] , [16] , the PoP protocol is not included as a part of the mandatory procedure: they all agree on the necessity of PoP, but the security problem caused by omitting PoP is not clearly provided. Moreover, it is recommended that the security protocol in a public key environment should not assume that the PoP protocol is executed, as many certificate authorities that do not execute this protocol while registering the public key still exist [1] .
It is shown that the proposed attack can be valid for both Kang et al's scheme as well as the Triple Schnorr scheme, which implies that both of these do not preserve the verifiability and unforgeability (mentioned in Sect. 1).
Attack against the Triple Schnorr Scheme
If an adversary has knowledge g x A mod p is the public key of Alice, that adversary can perform the following attack. 
Generate t ∈ R Z
, and s F ← f · skp + k F mod q, it passes the proxy signature verification procedure as the verifier can check if the following equations hold after generating the proxy public key
(Note that e = h(0||m w ||y A ||y F ||r A ) and f = h(1||m||m w ||y A || y F ||r A ||r F ).) Therefore, the adversary can generate a proxy signature on behalf of Alice without the valid proxy of Alice.
Attack against Kang et al's Scheme
If an adversary knows g x A ∈ G which is the public key of Alice, following attack can be done. = e(g, v F ).
Therefore, the adversary can generate a proxy signature on behalf of Alice without the valid proxy of Alice.
Conclusion
In this letter, a rogue public key registration attack against two proxy signature schemes is proposed with the assumption that users need not execute the PoP protocol when they register their public keys to the certificate authority. It has been shown that both Kang et al's scheme and the Triple Schnorr scheme are vulnerable to the proposed attack. The contribution of this work can be considered as showing the importance of PoP in the PKI environment.
